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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper examines how the impact of Chinese P2P platform reputation directly and 
indirectly (mediate effect) affects investors’ (lenders) investment choices.  
Design/methodology/approach – Using data collected from 478 P2P platforms, this paper calculates 
Platform Reputation via a beta function after establishing the Reputation mechanism by Game 
Analysis. This is followed by testing both the direct effect of platform reputation on investors’ 
investment choices (proxying by transaction volume) and the indirect effect through credit enhancing 
information using three regression models (Median regression, OLS regression, and random effect 
OLS regression). A robustness test by adding instrument variables is conducted to confirm the 
findings from the main regressions. 
Findings – In China, P2P lending platform reputations have played both a direct and indirect (through 
credit enhancing information) roles on investors’ investment choices.  
Originality/value – This paper expands the boundary of P2P online lending research by not only 
examining the direct, but importantly, the indirect effects of platform reputations.  
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1. Introduction
Following the first peer-to-peer (P2P) online platform (Zopa) in the world launched in the UK in 
2005, the first Chinese online P2P lending platform (CreditEase) was established in 2006. The P2P 
online lending market in China has dramatically surged in recent years. For example: the number of 
P2P lending platforms in 2010 was only 15; 148 in 2012; 523 in 2013; 900 in 2014 (Wei, 2015); and 
by the end of June 2018, the numbers reached 1,863. According to The International Organization of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO), China is the third country after the US and the UK in terms of P2P 
transaction value (Mo, 2014). The driving forces of the sharp rise in P2P platforms include the 
significant increase in the numbers of rich people in China (especially middle-class young generation), 
the government’s tightening monetary policy in 2007, the bear stock and property market since 2011, 
and the development of new internet technology. The popularity of the online lending market is 
because P2P platforms can facilitate bank functions by acting as an intermediary channel effectively 
connecting between many small-scale lenders who have spare money to invest, hoping for a better 
return than the interest they would achieve in a bank. In fact, these small-scale borrowers (mainly 
small and micro enterprises and individuals) find it difficult to obtain bank loans without collateral 
(Yum et al., 2012). 
Simultaneously, significant numbers of these platforms in China are unhealthy and problematic. 
According to one of the main P2P portals (P2Peye), as of December 2017, the problematic platforms 
in China reached 50.69%, within which 54.2% were platforms that the owners of platforms illegally 
ran away with or hid cash (‘Paolu’ in Chinese); as a consequence, these platforms were unable to 
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maintain normal operations. For example, in July 2018, 218 problem platforms collapsed, causing 
panic among investors and the public. Some victims demonstrated on the street for the right to get 
their money back, and in some extreme cases, victims even committed suicide.  The recent severe 
turmoil of P2P online leading was defined as a ‘financial explosion’ (‘Baolei’ in Chinese, meaning 
‘bomb exploded’) which spotlighted a moral hazard issue of P2P platforms. 
The concept of moral hazard was widely used by British insurance companies in the late 19th century 
representing fraud or immoral behaviour. In his book “The Return of Depression Economics and the 
Crisis of 2008,” the economist and Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman described moral hazard as 
“…any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone 
else bears the cost if things go badly” (Krugman, 2009, p. 63). In other words, moral hazard involves 
a contract affecting the behaviour of two parties (principal-agent model) under the circumstance of 
information asymmetry: the agent (holding better information) has incentives to change their 
behaviour while the subsequent risk is at the expense of the principal (holding less information). 
Examples of moral hazard are broadly observed in the fields of insurance, consumer behaviour, and 
finance. In the context of P2P online lending, we propose moral hazard to be, due to information 
asymmetry, online lending platforms deliberately hiding some information (e.g. the borrowers’ true 
credit information) or taking risky behaviour in order to maximise its own profits/commissions at the 
cost of the investors (the lenders). 
Figure 1 shows a disproportionate development between the numbers of new and hazardous platforms 
during 2010 – 2017 in China.  
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Insert Figure 1 here 
The emergence of significant moral hazard issues in China along with the rapid growth of P2P online 
lending platforms can be analysed from the differences in institutional, regulatory, and industrial 
environments, compared to other developed countries such as the UK and the US.     
With regards to the institutional environment in the UK and the US, the development of P2P online 
lending has been integrated and compatible with a highly developed financial system, for example, 
SMEs and individuals freely have access to the lending facilities provided by commercial banks, 
building societies and P2P lending platforms depending on their needs and preference. In contrast, 
China has long been dominated by state-owned commercial banks which provide their loans mainly 
to large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises while privately small and micro enterprises, and 
farmers (who are the main borrowers on P2P platforms) are discriminated. On the other hand, stock 
and property markets have fluctuated for a long period of time and many individual investors (the 
main providers of funds to P2P platforms) have to seek investment returns from P2P platforms, even 
having knowledge that this may be of high risk (Chen, 2016).    
In terms of the regulatory environment, both the UK and the US have well-established online lending 
regulations including market access threshold, registration and quality of information disclosed. For 
instance, all P2P online lending platforms are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the US and by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK. The relevant regulatory 
frameworks are designed to achieve the primary purposes of protecting consumers, promoting fair 
and effective competition within the industry, ensuring platforms provide transparent and non-
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misleading information to the users, ensuring P2P platforms maintain sustainable development, and 
having contingency arrangements in the event of platform failure. Whilst in China, in the initial stages 
(2006-2012) and during rapid development (2013-2015) of the P2P lending market, there were no 
formal industry regulations (i.e. no market access threshold, no registration policy and no information 
disclosure requirements) and all written documents were at the level of “Opinions and Suggestions” 
to the sector and heavily relied on the sector’s self-discipline (Chen, 2016). This legal loophole was 
seized by some owners of P2P platforms who used the platforms as illegal fund-raising tools and who 
would then disappear with investors’ money. As such, the absence of a regulatory system caused 
chaotic and moral hazard problems. It wasn’t until 2016 that the Chinese government began to pay 
attention to the regulations of the online lending market; however, the Chinese framework still 
requires substantial improvement. 
Regarding the industry environment, we refer to the credit rating of borrowers and platform risk 
control. In the UK, a sound credit database collected by national credit bureaus that provides a unified 
credit rating for individuals (including car loans, mortgages, credit cards and default payment records) 
is available to use by P2P online lending platforms. A similar system is operated in the US (e.g. FICO 
score). However, in China there is no such national unified personal credit rating system. The lack of 
a unified and credible database for online credit ratings results in most P2P online lending platforms 
only disclosing credit information provided by the borrowers; some responsible platforms may carry 
out additional checks for the authenticity and reliability of this information (Chen, 2016). In other 
words, P2P platforms in China bear much higher default risks by borrowers than their counterparts 
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in the UK and the US, which highlights the importance of platform reputation (the issue of our paper’s 
focus) as it can reduce uncertainty in this new industry and mitigate the moral hazard caused.   
Platform reputation refers to P2P participants’ (particularly lenders) perception of the platform’s 
institutional mechanism that can effectively facilitate lending success and protect their interest. Extant 
studies are concentrated on issues such as the operation mode of online P2P lending, the impact 
of ’hard’ information (e.g. personal information) and ‘soft’ information (e.g. participants’ comments 
on social media) on lending outcomes (Chen and Han, 2012). Online customer reviews/feedback can 
affect the reputation of online platforms, for example, eBay, Taobao, and EachNet indicate that 
reputation built on customer feedback can effectively affect platform behaviour in service 
improvement (Howcroft et al., 2012; Wu and Li, 2009; Cai et al., 2014; Li et al., 2016). However, 
issues such as how platform reputation affect lenders’ investment decision and in what ways, are 
largely omitted.   
To address this gap, this paper has examined the direct and indirect (mediating) effect of P2P platform 
reputation on investors lending decision using data collected from 478 P2P platforms listed on the 
most influential P2P lending portals holding by third parties (WDZJ-网贷之家 and P2Peye-网贷天
眼). Firstly, platform Reputation was calculated based on investors’ evaluations using beta function. 
Secondly, using median regression, OLS regression and random effect OLS regression respectively, 
we tested the direct effect of platform reputation on investors’ investment choices (using lending 
transaction volume as the proxy) and the indirect effect through platform credit enhancing 
information (i.e. platform registered capital, platform location, types of platforms, etc.). Thirdly, we 
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ran further tests by adding some instrument variables (i.e. CEO’s education background, membership 
of professional associations) to confirm the direct and indirect factors, and finally, we ran a robustness 
test by replacing transaction volume using the duration of platforms to conclude the regression results. 
The structure of the paper is arranged as follows: section 2 builds the platform reputation mechanism 
using Game Analysis; section 3 develops hypotheses for testing; section 4 explains data collection, 
variables, measurements, and analytical models; section 5 presents all empirical findings; and finally, 
section 6 concludes the findings and discusses the contributions, implications, and limitations.  
2. The Market for Lemons’ theory, Signal Theory and Reputation mechanism in Game Analysis
Taking second-hand cars as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty when information held 
by buyers and sellers are asymmetric, Akerlof (1970) created the “Market for Lemons” theory. The 
theory suggests, some cars are “lemons” (in American slang, meaning defective used cars) and some 
are good quality cars. In the car selling market, buyers can never be told which cars are “lemons” and 
which are not, but sellers know them clearly. As such, buyers are only willing to pay a price 
representing an average quality car, and this (lower price to good quality cars) would consequently 
discourage the owners of good quality cars to sell their cars. Accordingly, buyers may risk ending up 
with a “lemon” (a defective car). 
An effective way of solving the “Market for Lemons” problem is through signal transmission. 
According to Signal Theory (Spence, 1974), market signals are individual behaviours and 
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characteristics (such as education level, reputation, and brand) that can be observed by other market 
participants which can convey information in the market. Spence argues that market participants can 
turn low-level signals into high-level signals by adding some costs. Taking the used car market as an 
example again, sellers with good quality cars can provide a warranty with their cars in order to provide 
a positive signal to potential buyers about the quality of their cars (Zhang, 2013). Of course, sellers 
with “lemons” will not be willing to provide such a warranty. Therefore, the warranty is provided as 
an effective market signal to convey and distinguish the different qualities of the used cars. In the 
process of repeated games, “warranty” can represent the “reputation” of good quality cars. 
Similarly, in the P2P online lending market, lenders (investors) hold less information about borrowers 
than the platforms, but they can provide online ratings to record their satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
of the lending experience. In a repeated game, this rating can be thought as an effective signal to 
distinguish the different qualities of online lending platforms. In other words, investor rating on 
platforms can be used as a proxy of the platform reputation. In this section, we use Game Analysis 
to analyse and prove how the reputation of an online lending platform can be built and why it can be 
used as an effective signal to distinguish the qualities of online lending platforms. 
Reputation mechanism 
Assuming that investors are rationally seeking to maximise their utility, there are two types of 
platforms: low quality platforms (θ1) and high-quality platforms (θ2); θ1=1, θ2=2. Platform reputation 
(R) also has two types: low reputation platform (R1) and high reputation platform (R2); R1=0 and
R2=1. Assuming that the cost function of platform reputation is C(R, θ)=1.5R/θ, it suggests that to 
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build the same reputation level, the platforms with different levels of quality need to pay differing 
amounts of costs. 
If an investor decides to invest on the platform based on its reputation level，the investment amount 
is L(R)= θ, and when R=R1, L(R)=θ1 and when R=R2, L(R)=θ2. Assuming intermediary fees, 
commissions, and management charges are the main income sources of the online platforms, 
platforms that have better reputations should earn higher income because attracting more investors 
would result in greater transactions. That is, supposing the income function of the platform is:  I(R, 
θ)=θ, the utility function of the platform is U(R, L)=L-1.5R/ θ. That is to say, the greater the trading 
volume of the platform, the higher the utility of the platform. To improve its reputation, the platform 
would pay more costs, and thus the utility of the platform would be reduced. In order to simplify the 
analysis, it is assumed that under the conditions of complete competition, L(R)=I(R, θ), the 
competitive utility of the platform is 0. 
In fact, borrowers and lenders do not know whether the quality of the platform is high or low, and 
investors only know the probability distribution of the platform type. Assuming the prior probability 
is the same to all platforms, i.e. P(θ1)=P(θ2)=1/2, in the absence of reputation information, investors 
make choice purely based on the prior probability. Suppose the expected future earnings of the 
platform is E(I), and E(I)=I(θ1) P(θ1) + I(θ2) P(θ2), that is E(I) = (1 + 2) / 2 = 1.5. The maximum 
expected income for high quality and low quality platforms is I(θ2)=2 and I(θ1)=1 respectively. As 
indicated by I(θ2)< E(I) and I(θ1)> E(I), it indicates that lower quality platforms receive more income 
and the higher quality platforms receive less income. According to the utility function U(R, L)= L-
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1.5R/ θ, one can see that high quality platforms can reduce their effectiveness due to receiving less 
investment; while low quality platforms can increase their effectiveness due to higher investment 
scale; as such adverse selection problems occurred. 
After adding reputation information, platforms have more choices of utility regardless of their 
quality.  
For low-quality platforms, the utility choices under different reputations are: 
If θ = θ1=1，when R=R1=0，L(R)= θ1=1，then U (R1, L) =L-1.5R/ θ =1； 
when R=R2=1，L(R)= θ2=2，then U (R2, L) =L-1.5R/ θ =0.5. 
For high-quality platforms, the utility choices under different reputations are: 
If θ = θ2=2，when R=R1=0，L(R)= θ1=1，then U (R1, L) =L-1.5R/ θ =1； 
when R=R2=1，L(R)= θ2=2，then U (R2, L) =L-1.5R/ θ =1.25. 
It can be seen that for low quality platforms, U(R1, θ1)> U(R2, θ1), which means  low reputation would 
maximise the utility (a wise option); for high quality platforms, as U(R1, θ2)< U(R2, θ2), it suggests 
continuously maintaining their high reputation would be the most effective choice. Theoretically, 
Reputation can distinguish platforms by qualities, and through platform reputational signal, investors 
can make their choices.  
Behavioural choice of investors 
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According to the Bayesian rule, by having reputation information, investors can make investment 
choices based on the posteriori probability (P’(θ)) which is corrected prior probability after 
considering reputation information. Supposing the prior probability for all platforms is the same, that 
is, P (θ1) =P (θ2) =1/2, the probability for the platforms with high reputation and high quality is P 
(R2|θ2), and the probability for the platforms with low reputation and low quality is P (R1|θ1). The 
probability for platforms with low reputation and high quality platform is P (R1|θ2), and the 
probability for the platforms with high reputation and low quality platform is P (R2|θ1). 
If investors receive information: the reputation for low quality platform is R=R1, then according to 
the Bayesian rule, investors will get the posteriori probability P’(θ1 |R1) for the platforms with low 
quality to maintain their reputation as follows: 
𝑃′(𝜃1 𝑅1⁄ ) =
P(𝑅1 𝜃1⁄ )P(𝜃1)
𝑃(𝑅1)
=
P(𝑅1 𝜃1⁄ )P(𝜃1)
P(𝑅1 𝜃2⁄ )P(𝜃2) + P(𝑅1 𝜃1⁄ )P(𝜃1)
， 
as P(𝜃1) = P(𝜃2) = 0.5， 
then 𝑃′(𝜃1 𝑅1⁄ ) =
P(𝑅1 𝜃1⁄ )
P(𝑅1 𝜃2⁄ )+P(𝑅1 𝜃1⁄ )
For platforms with low reputation, their maintaining high quality probability P (R1|θ2) is less than the 
low quality probability P (R1|θ1); therefore P’( θ1|R1) > P (θ1), (0.5), i.e. posterior probability is greater 
than the prior probability, thus on the basis of prior probability, investors would further revise prior 
probability and conclude the probability of these platforms in providing low quality services is greater 
than the prior probability. As a result, investors will reduce investment. 
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Similarly, 
𝑃′(𝜃2 𝑅2⁄ ) =
P(𝑅2 𝜃2⁄ )P(𝜃2)
𝑃(𝑅2)
=
P(𝑅2 𝜃2⁄ )P(𝜃2)
P(𝑅2 𝜃1⁄ )P(𝜃1) + P(𝑅2 𝜃2⁄ )P(𝜃2)
=
P(𝑅2 𝜃2⁄ )
P(𝑅2 𝜃1⁄ ) + P(𝑅2 𝜃2⁄ )
For platforms with high reputation, P(R2|θ1) is less than P(R2|θ2), then P’(θ 2|R2)> P(θ2) (0.5), posterior 
probability is greater than the prior probability, investors would conclude the probability of these 
platforms in providing high quality services is greater than the prior probability. Consequently, 
investors will increase investment.  
The role of reputation mechanisms in mitigating moral hazard 
Studies on reputation mechanisms are generally mature (Greif, 1993; Brown et al., 2000). According 
to the KMRW reputation model, reputation premium generated during a long-term repeated game 
will lead to improved cooperation between the participants, avoiding the occurrence of the prisoner's 
dilemma1 (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Shi et al., 2015). 
Based on studies conducted by Xiao and Sheng (2003) and Greif (2004) on reputation mechanisms, 
assume that there are n online lending platforms and N potential investors, and each investor can only 
choose one lending platform and one lending project in each game. Lending platforms are chosen 
randomly. In such a case, the probability for lending platform “P” to be chosen by investor “I” is 1/n, 
and each platform is expected to see N/n lending projects at most in each game. If an online lending 
1 A typical example in game theory that shows a paradox in decision analysis that two completely rational individuals 
may act in their own self-interests at the expense of the other participant which results no optimal outcome. 
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platform chooses to cheat an investor through concealing information, it can obtain short-term income 
d; if it chooses to disclose strictly selected information, it can obtain the income c (d＞c). The discount 
factor isδ. If an investor is cheated because it cannot directly monitor the behaviour of the platform, 
it will spread the bad faith of the platform to k-1 potential investors, and the value of k-1 is determined 
by the speed and scope of information spreading. If the investor applies the trigger strategy, the 
investor and all other potential investors who receive the information will not invest on this platform 
in the future. 
Only when the long-term income is greater than the short-term income, the reputation mechanism 
would motivate online lending platforms to disclose strictly selected information of borrowers, that 
is,  
𝑑 − c ≤
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
∙
𝑘𝑐
𝑛
or 
𝑑−𝑐
𝑐
≤
𝛿
1−𝛿
∙
𝑘
𝑛
   （1） 
Whether inequality (1) can hold is determined by the value of 
k
n
 in which n refers to the number of 
online lending platforms which will not change significantly due to the behavioural choice of a certain 
platform. The value of 
k
n
 is mainly determined by k, which refers to the number of potential investors
knowing the bad faith of the platform.  
Platform reputation related information will become open and observable once credit scores of 
borrowers rated by investors and other lending-related information are publicly available (Wu, 2007; 
Dellarocas et al., 2008; Jolivet, 2016; Fan et al., 2016). Likewise, platform reputation based on 
15 
investors’ reviews can spread quickly in the case that these platforms have fraudulent behaviour. In 
such a case, the value of k in the equation (1) will be great enough, thus more potential investors can 
receive reputation information of the platform based on existing investors’ reviews and walk away 
from investing in it. By repeating the process, the reputation mechanism can mitigate moral hazard 
in P2P lending. 
3. Hypothesis development
From the discussions in the last section, we can see that information asymmetry (a typical example 
of “Market for Lemons”) is a serious problem in the market. Due to differences in institutional, 
regulatory, and industrial environments, the information asymmetry in Chinese P2P lending is even 
more serious which has caused a great deal of uncertainty, suggesting the sector is under endogenous 
high risk which could lead to a serious consequence of fraudulent activities at some point. 
Holmstrom (1984) proposed several remedies for mitigating asymmetric information and one of them 
is reputation – a kind of ‘soft information’ which received more recognition in China (Lee and Lee, 
2012; Chen and Han, 2012). Platforms with a good reputation suggest trust has been established 
between the platform and investors; therefore, platform reputation is a kind of institution-based trust. 
Institution-based trust is especially suitable for P2P online lending where investors predominantly 
lend money to totally unknown and innominate borrowers under the circumstance that the platform 
(third party) provides the institutional context (Pavlou and Gefen, 2004). 
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Driven by new digital technology, P2P online lending platforms provide an alternative to traditional 
banking by bring together non-institutional borrowers and lenders (most are individuals or small 
business owners), while platforms act as information intermediaries. The innovation and popularity 
of P2P online lending leads to an efficient way of directly matching the supply and demand from 
small and medium sized borrowers and lenders (investors) to enable them to extend credit at lower 
rates compared to bank charges (Wei, 2015). 
Although the innovative lending channel can expand the boundary of lending and reduce the cost of 
financial transactions, the information asymmetry between the two parties cannot be eased, but 
extended. This is because in the traditional lending market, investors can make investment decisions 
relying on the information disclosed by the company and the information required is regulated by the 
stock market or other regulations (Fishman and Hagerty, 1989). However, due to imperfect 
information disclosure mechanisms (e.g. borrowers’ credit rating) and a lack of regulations in the P2P 
lending market, P2P investors mainly depend on the information disclosed by the platform about 
borrowers. If borrowers’ moral hazard emerges (i.e. overdue loans and bad debts), investors will lose 
money. If many defaults occur, the platform will not continue to operate (Yang, 2016). 
The moral hazard of P2P lending platforms is mainly caused by two reasons. Firstly, platforms (the 
agent) and investors (the principal) do not share the same objective/utility function. As shown in 
Figure 2, investors’ interest is to maximise returns from investments, and therefore they care more 
about the return rate which is dependent on the credit status of borrowers. However, due to 
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information asymmetry, anonymity and invisibility of online lending, investors can only acquire 
borrowers’ information and credit scores disclosed selectively by lending platforms. Contrarily, the 
interest of lending platforms is to maximise commission fees/charges. If they set strict standards in 
selecting borrowers only with higher credit scores, their fees and charges would drop as a result that 
some borrowers would be removed. In such a case, lending platforms would have an intrinsic 
preference for maximizing income at the expense of investors – another kind of moral hazard from 
platforms. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Secondly, online lending currently does not have a mechanism to effectively monitor and control the 
behaviour of platforms. This mechanism exists in traditional lending through deposit contracts which 
can reduce the probability of moral hazard caused by information asymmetry (Campbell and Kracaw, 
1980; Diamond, 1984). In other words, due to information asymmetry, investors are unable to restrain 
the behaviour of P2P platforms in faithfully releasing and evaluating the borrower's credit information. 
Therefore, investors face the moral hazard of P2P platforms who are agent regulators – the risk has 
become the largest risk in Chinese P2P lending (Wu, 2015) in recent years. 
Due to the lack of an effective monitoring mechanism on P2P platforms, investors hardly evaluate 
their investment risks. They refer to peers’ evaluation through the Internet on the reputation of the 
platform (e.g. lending volume, comments etc.). In other words, investors’ choices put pressure on 
platforms in improving governance to reduce moral hazard. Therefore, it seems that we can suggest 
18 
through investors' investment choices, platform reputation can play a governance role to prevent 
moral hazard of the platform. However, this suggestion implies a condition, i.e. the platform only 
acts as the intermediary between lenders and borrowers; but in fact, P2P platforms also have a credit 
enhancing function beside its intermediary role.  
The most common credit enhancing method includes setting up risk reserves and capital. For example, 
the well-known UK P2P platform RateSetter has established a ‘Provision Fund’ to provide ‘a buffer 
against any poorly performing loans. The Provision Fund covers fully or partially borrowers’ default 
payments, and/or loss caused by the RateSetter platform itself (Terekhova, 2017). Provisional funds 
are also used by some Chinese P2P platforms as the prime credit enhancing method. Another credit 
enhancing method includes cooperating with third parties for guarantees (i.e. escrow services). For 
instance, in the UK, P2P platform ‘Lending Works’ provides ‘Insurance backed lending’ insured by 
external insurance companies. In China, ‘Paipai Dai’ (拍拍贷) and ‘Yiren Dai’ (宜人贷) also work 
with other third parties to provide lending insurance to reduce lenders’ investment risk. As such, 
platform capital and credit enhancing information can increase platform reputation and lending 
transactions. In this case, to avoid the influence of platform credit enhancing information on the test 
results, it is necessary to control platform credit enhancing information when examining the effect of 
platform reputation. Thus, we propose Hypothesis 1 as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Controlling credit enhancing factors, platform Reputation will significantly affect the 
investment choices of investors. 
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The fundamental reason why the above credit enhancing information can influence investors' 
investment choice is because such information can increase investors' trust on the platform (Chen and 
Lin, 2014). On the Internet, trust between people is difficult to maintain through personality and 
interpersonal relationships, and thus institution-based trust becomes so important for Internet 
transactions (Pavlou and Gefen, 2004). Institution-based trust refers to the trust that is based on the 
mechanism designed to make investors feel safe (Zucker, 1986), including situational norms and 
structural guarantees (provisional fund and insurance through third party guarantees are two 
components) (Mcknight et al., 1998). Institutional-based trust is a fundamental factor for the platform 
reputation in Chinese P2P online lending (Gao and Zhao, 2017). We thus propose the second 
hypothesis with two sub-hypotheses expressed below: 
Hypothesis 2a: Platform credit enhancing information will significantly affect the Reputation of the 
platform. 
Hypothesis 2b: As a mediating variable, Reputation of the platform affect investors' investment choice 
through credit enhancing information. 
4. Methodology
(1) Measurements and model building
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Sample 
The data was collected from the main P2P lending platform portals mentioned based on the 
availability of research variables. The original data was carefully scrutinised in dealing with 
exceptional and omitted values. The final sample includes 478 (295 healthy and 183 unhealthy) online 
P2P lending platforms and the data covers the periods from 1st June to 31st December 2017.  
Table 1 defines research variables used in the study. 
Table 1 is around here 
Dependent variable (lnVolume) 
From the game analysis shown earlier, it is understood that the impact of reputation is reflected by 
investors' investment choices and changes in the trading scale of the platform. As such, to test the 
effect of reputation, the trading volume of the platform is used as the predictor variable. Platform 
volume refers to the cumulative volume of each platform from June 1 to December 31, 2017. 
Logarithms were used to reduce the heteroscedasticity of data.  
Prime independent variable – Calculating platform reputation (Reputation) 
The ‘Reputation’ of the 478 online lending platforms was calculated using a beta function calculator 
based on the trust model by Xiong and Liu (2004). Assuming that Beta probability density function 
is a continuous function composed of parameter α and parameter 𝛽, the Beta distribution f (𝑝|𝛼, 𝛽) 
may be expressed in the following equations:  
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𝑓(𝑝|𝛼, 𝛽) =
Γ(𝛼+𝛽)
Γ(𝛼)Γ(𝛽)
𝑝𝛼−1(1 − 𝑝)𝛽−1,      𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒   0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1，𝛼 > 0，𝛽 > 0    (1)
Expected Beta distribution E(p): 
E(𝑝) = 𝛼 𝛼 + 𝛽⁄ （2） 
Investors’ reviews of online lending platforms are divided into positive reviews (r) and negative 
reviews (s). Assume that positive reviews may increase the reputation of online lending platforms, 
and negative reviews may decrease the reputation of online lending platforms. 𝑟𝑖  and si  are the 
number of positive reviews and negative reviews received by an online lending platform in the ith 
month. R and S respectively refer to the positive reviews and negative reviews received by the 
platform during a period of time n (R = ∑ 𝑟𝑖  ,   𝑆 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 ).
According to Eq. (1), the following equation may be created: 
 φ(𝑝|𝑅, 𝑆) =
Γ(𝑅+𝑆)
Γ(𝑅𝑖)Γ(𝑆𝑖)
𝑝𝑅−1(1 − 𝑝)𝑆−1  0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1，𝑅 > 0，𝑆 > 0           (3) 
φ(𝑝|𝑅, 𝑆)φ(𝑝|𝑅, 𝑆)  may reflect the reputation of the platform. According to Eq. (2), the 
reputation value of the platform can be calculated through the following equation: 
   E( φ(𝑝|𝑅, 𝑆)) = 𝑅 (𝑅 + 𝑆)⁄ (4) 
E( φ(𝑝|𝑅, 𝑆)) is the reputation value calculated based on investors’ reviews on a platform 
during a time period (n). 
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However, reputation value obtained through Eq. (4) has two problems. First, Eq. (4) assumes that 
both negative reviews and positive reviews have the same effects on platform reputation; while 
according to Park and Lee (2009) and Yang and Mai (2010), negative reviews have greater effects 
than positive reviews. Second, Eq. (4) fails to consider the fact that reviewers normally pay more 
attention to the latest reviews than the earlier reviews, i.e. earlier reviews would have less influence 
on reputation (Wen and Ye, 2014). Therefore, Eq. (4) should be revised as follows:  
Assume that  R = δ ∙ S，and δ > 1; negative reviews are given more weight. 
R = ∑ 𝑟𝑖  𝜆
𝑛−𝑖, 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 𝜆
𝑛−𝑖, 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1𝑛𝑖 ; the weight of time is set.
The revised Eq. (4) reflects how reviews given at different moments affect reputation differently and 
was used to calculate the average reputation value of the 478 sample platforms.  
Furthermore, to verify the reliability of platform reputation built, we also compared the rankings 
between our ‘Reputation’ calculation and the one calculated by WDZJ in 2017 on 100 P2P platforms 
and found 81.77% of similarity which proved our calculation result significantly agreed with that 
produced by the reputable platform. The gap might be caused by the different components and 
numbers of platforms included between the two calculation systems, however our sample numbers 
(478) is significantly larger than the counterpart from WDZJ (100). This feature gives our study some
merits. 
Credit enhancing independent variables 
There are generally two kinds of factors affecting platform credit conditions: platform registered 
capital funds and capital guarantee methods used by platforms. Loureiro and Gonzalez (2015) stated 
P2P lending can be used as a tool in allaying financial exclusion. Moreover, P2P platforms use their 
own funds and operations to gradually build reputation as collateral. As such, P2P platforms not only 
smooth credit and liquidity conversion, but also build credit (Li et al., 2016). In the presence of the 
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information asymmetry problem, P2P platforms need to use a variety of methods to safeguard 
investors' money, e.g. provisional funds, mortgages on borrower's assets, financing or non-financing 
firm guarantees and joint liabilities by small loan companies. The more guarantee methods used by 
platforms, the higher the degree of safeguard for investors. We thus use types of capital guarantee 
methods as the measurement of Guarantee variable.   
In China, apart from platform registered capital funds and capital guarantee methods, other factors of 
so-called social capital (soft information) can also influence the P2P lending platforms reducing the 
risk of adverse selection (Lin et al., 2013) and providing trust (Rieh, 2002). Chinese P2P investors 
rely more on this kind of soft information to make investment decisions (Chen and Han, 2012). The 
social capital generates mainly from the characteristics of P2P platforms, such as ownership and 
geographical locations. 
The ownership of Chinese P2P platforms comprises of four types (see Table 2), that is (1) bank-
involved, (2) publicly listed, (3) state-owned, and (4) private platforms. Bank-involved platforms are 
invested by commercial banks, which are well-funded with ample liquidity and qualification of 
getting access into China’s Central Bank Credit Reporting Database for obtaining borrower credit 
conditions to ease the information asymmetry problem. As such, they are the most attractive platforms 
for investors. Publicly listed platforms are established by listed companies to diversify businesses 
upstream and downstream of the industry chain. They are less popular compared to bank-involved 
platforms. State-owned platforms are held by state-owned companies and are implicitly endorsed by 
the state; however, the volume of lending transactions and participants are quite low because of the 
cautious nature of government policy. The largest number of P2P platforms is privately invested with 
the characteristics of early entry, low entrance threshold, high yield and risk. As a result, in terms of 
average volume of lending private platforms are at the lowest position (though they entered the market 
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earlier than the other types). The unhealthiest platforms are amongst this kind. It is obvious from 
Table 2, there are apparent attribute differences of P2P platforms in China.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Another feature of social capital relates to geographical location of the platforms. The People's 
Congress of China classified provinces and municipalities into eastern, central and western regions 
based on per capita and gross domestic product (GDP). By the end of 2017, the eastern region consists 
of 11 coastal provinces representing a highly developed region, there are 8 provinces in the central 
region representing mid-level development, and 12 in the western region representing a less 
developed area. The development levels in different regions generally represent the levels of credit 
and social trust, with the eastern region having the highest, and the western region having the lowest 
(Zhang and Ke, 2002).    
Analytical model building 
Two models are set up to test the direct and indirect effects of reputation: 
𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝜀  (1) 
𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 = 𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃
𝑡
𝑖=1        (2) 
In model (1), lnVolume is a log of the accumulated value of loans of the sample platforms from 
01/06/17 to 31/12/17. Reputation represents the investor evaluation on platforms; Interest and Month 
are control variables. 𝜀 is error correction term. In model (2), Xi represents all explanatory and control 
variables explained in Table 3 including Reputation, Type, Address, lnCapital, Guarantee, Month 
and Interest. θ is error correction term. 
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(2) Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Descriptive statistics analysis 
The variables’ statistic description is summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3 is around here 
As shown in Table 3, the mean of Reputation of the 478 P2P platforms is close to 0.5, but the 
difference between the maximum and minimum values is significant, with the highest value reaching 
almost 1.0 and the lowest value just around 0.0005. This suggests the quality range of the sample P2P 
platforms represented by Reputation is larger. The mean of Interest is 12.79% with the highest and 
lowest value between 32% and 4.4%, suggesting the income of platforms is also dispersed. The Month 
represents the length of P2P loan ranging from 0.5 months to 43 months, with a mean of 4.6 months. 
With regards to loan volume (lnVolume), the average amount of loan value by sample platforms is 
103,600 yuan (RMB), the maximum is 171,300 yuan, and the minimum is 38,500 yuan, with an 
average of 103,600 yuan. The average registered capital of the platforms is 82,900 yuan, with the 
maximum of 126,100 yuan and the minimum of 50,100 yuan. Regarding the types of guarantee 
approaches adopted by these platforms, the highest is 7 while the lowest is 0 suggesting these 
platforms do not have any measures and approaches to protect lenders. The average number of 
guarantee methods is just 1.58 (a very low reading). In terms of locations (Address) of the sample 
P2P platforms, 76% are located in the developed Eastern region while only 8.6% are in the less 
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developed Western region, others are in the Central region. Regarding the types of platforms, 80% 
are privately owned, 8.4% are publicly listed while bank-involved platforms only account for 0.4% 
(equals 2 platforms), proving the majority of P2P platforms are informal lending providers. 
Correlation analysis 
lnVolume (dependent variable) and other variables were analysed using Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient. As Table 4 indicates, Reputation is positively correlated with lnVolume and Guarantee 
at 1% statistically significant level. The same relationship was observed between lnVolume and 
lnCapital, Month, Address1 (eastern), Type 2 (bank involved), and Type 3 (publicly listed). In contrast, 
Reputation is negatively correlated with Interest and Type 1 (private) at 1% statistically significant 
level. Similarly, lnVolume are negatively and statistically significant correlated with Interest and Type 
1 (private) at 1% level. The results suggest that P2P loan interest rates are not the main attracting 
factor for investors while platform reputation and other factors such as platform ownership and 
location also play important parts in their investment decision. 
Insert Table 4 around here 
5. Empirical findings
(1) Effects of platform reputation
Direct effects 
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Median regression, OLS regression, and random effect OLS regression are used to test the direct and 
indirect effects of Reputation on lnVolume (Jayaraman and Milbourn, 2012). Firstly, to test direct 
effects of Reputation on lnVolume in model (1), we control other variables which might influence 
Reputation indirectly including lnCaptial, Guarantee, Type, Address and the results are listed in 
columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 5. Secondly, we test all variables in model (2) respectively and the 
results are listed in columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 5 correspondingly. 
Insert Table 5 around here 
In columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 5, lnCaptial (registered capital), Type 2 (bank-involved) and Address 
1 (eastern region platforms) are strongly statistically significant which indicate they also significantly 
influence Reputation on lnVolume. This proves that when assessing direct effects of Reputation on 
lnVolume (Hypothesis 1), credit enhancing variables should be controlled. Columns 1, 2 and 3 of 
Table 5 indicate that Reputation has significant effects on lnVolume reaching statistical significance 
at 1% after controlling other credit enhancing factors. The results in columns 1, 2 and 3 further verifies 
Hypothesis 1.  
Indirect effects (mediate effects) 
According to Wen and Ye (2014), in order to examine whether Reputation has mediated on credit 
enhancing variables, three equations need to be established first:  
    lnVolume = P ∗ Credit + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 + 𝑒1   （5） 
Reputation = a ∗ Credit + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 + 𝑒2 （6）
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lnVolume = P′ ∗ Credit + b ∗ Reputation + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 + 𝑒3    （7） 
Credit represents Credit-enhancing variables including Address1, Address2, Type1, Type2, Type3, 
lnCapital and Guarantee; ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1  are control variables (Interest and Month); P, P’, a, and b are 
coefficients, 𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3 are error correction terms.  
First step is to test equation (5): if Credit and lnVolume are not statistically significantly correlated, 
then the test of mediate effects should be abundant. It suggests that there is no mediate effect. If Credit 
is significantly correlated with lnVolume, it should be verified that Reputation is a mediate variable 
between the credit-enhancing variables and lnVolume. 
Second step is to test coefficients a and b in equations (6) and (7): if a and b are significantly 
correlated, the coefficient P’ in equation (7) needs to be further tested. If P’ is not significant, it proves 
the mediate effects are fully disseminated by Reputation; if significant, it would suggest that the 
mediate effects are partially disseminated by Reputation.  If either a or b is significant, the mediate 
effects can be further tested using the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982).  
As such, testing the mediate effects is required to establish another two regression models:  
𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒1 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒2 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒3 +
       𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝑒1      （3） 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒1 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒2 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒3 +
 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝑒2 （4）
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Models (3) and (4) are mainly used to test the impact of credit enhancing information on lnVolume 
and Reputation respectively, though control variables are included.  The results from median 
regression, OLS regression, and random effect OLS regression are reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 
(lnVolume) and 4, 5 and 6 (Reputation) of Table 6 accordingly. 
Insert Table 6 around here 
From columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 6, one can see credit enhancing variables lnCapital, Type1, 
Type 2 and Address 1 have positive and significant effects on lnVolume. This suggests Reputation 
plays mediate roles on these variables but not on Type3, Address 2 and Guarantee (recording them 
“no” in the final column of Table 6). From columns (4), (5) and (6), of Table 6 we observed credit 
enhancing variables (lnCapital, Type1, Address 1, Guarantee) and control variables (Interest, Month) 
are significant. The results support Hypothesis 2a.   
Furthermore, the significance in columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 6 for credit enhancing variables 
(lnCapital, Type1, Adress1) suggests coefficient a in equation (6) is significant. Similarly, the 
significance of coefficient b in equation (7) can be seen from the columns (4), (5) and (6) in Table 5. 
If we count the numbers of variable significance in the columns (4), (5) and (6) of Tables 5 and 6 
respectively and record them in the final column of Table 6 (e.g. both a and b are significant, 
recording as 2; either a or b is significant, recording as 1), we can see lnCapital, Type1, Adress1 have 
both a and b significant (counting 2). Taking the 3 variables back to further observe the columns (4), 
(5) and (6) in Table 5, we found lnCapital, and Adress1 are statistically significant but not for Type1.
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The results suggest that Reputation has partial mediate effects on lnCapital, and Adress1 while full 
mediate effect on Type1.  
The final column of Table 6 shows that in the Reputation’s direct (Table 5) and indirect (Table 6) 
effect regression analyses, Type 2 only shows one significant (counting 1), therefore, Reputation’s 
mediating effect on this variable requires to be further verified by the Sobel test. In the Sobel test, 
platform CEOs’ education level (edu) was added as an instrumental variable. The test results are 
listed in Table 7.  
Insert Table 7 around here 
As shown in Table 7, Reputation has no significant mediating effect on Type 2 (only 3.023%). 
From the analyses in Tables 5, 6 and 7, we can conclude that platform reputations (Reputation) have 
partial mediate effects on platform registered capital (lnCapital), platforms located in the eastern area 
(Address 1), full mediate effects on private platforms (Type 1). Platform reputations (Reputation) 
have no obvious mediate effects on bank-involved platforms (Type 2), publicly listed platforms (Type 
3), platforms located in the western region (Address 2), and platform guarantee methods (Guarantee). 
Thus, Hypothesis 2b has been partially verified, that is, platform reputations have mediating effects 
on some credit enhancing variables. 
(2) Further evidence and robust test
31 
Further test by adding instrument variables  
Considering endogenous problems among independent variables, we set up the following test using 
two instrumental variables to confirm the results shown above. The first instrumental variable is Edu 
(CEO’s qualification). According to Hinojosa (2002), the CEO’s educational level is crucial for the 
development/reputation of the platform as it can generally reflect the capability of the CEO (Spence, 
1974). A dummy variable is used, with 0 representing CEO qualification at first degree or below, and 
1 representing Master or above. The second instrumental variable is Join, with 1 representing that the 
platform is a member of the Internet Banking Association (IBA), while 0 is for not joining the IBA. 
This is because according to the membership rule of IBA established in 2016, only platforms which 
are qualified with 3 criteria: (1) registered with the industrial authorities, (2) no serious violations in 
the last three years, and (3) no bad record from the management team, can apply for membership of 
the IBA. As such, investors treat IBA membership as representative of the platform’s self-discipline 
reputation and good governance, in other words, having platform reputation.     
Using Join and edu as instrumental variables, model (5) is established as follows： 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐽𝑜𝑖𝑛 + 𝛼2𝑒𝑑𝑢 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝛼5𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +
𝛼6𝐴𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠1 + 𝛼7𝐴𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛼8𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒1 + 𝛼9𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒2 + 𝛼10𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒3 + 𝛼11𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝜀2 
（5） 
After using OLS estimation model (5), a fitting value (prPep) was formed. Using join and edu as 
instrumental variables and lnVolume as dependent variable, we run regression again and the results 
are listed in Table 8. 
32 
Insert Table 8 around here 
The regression results in Table 8 show, in the first stage of the regression Reputation is significantly 
positively related to the two added instrumental variables (join and edu), which suggests IBA and 
CEO’s qualifications are attributed to platform reputation. The second stage of the three OLS 
regression results show that after the first stage regression fitting, the obtained prRep and platform 
trading volume are positively and significantly correlated. This regression result is the same with that 
in the columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 5. The results indicate that after controlling endogenous 
variables, the results stay the same. Therefore, the evidence supporting the argument of this paper is 
strengthened.  
Robust test  
To further confirm the results, a robust test was run by replacing lnVolume by the duration of 
platforms (lnTime), and model (6) is established as follows： 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = α0 + α1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + α2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + α3𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + α4𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + α5Adress1 
+𝛼6𝐴𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒1 + 𝛼8𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒2 + 𝛼9𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒3 + 𝛼10𝐺uarantee + 𝜀  （6）
The results from median regression, OLS regression, and random effect OLS regression of model (6) 
are reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 9 accordingly. 
33 
Insert Table 9 around here 
In Table 9, median regression is not significant, both OLS regression and random effects OLS have 
shown that Reputation and platform duration have a positive significant correlation. The results 
robustly confirm that platform reputation strongly influences the development of P2P platforms. 
6. Conclusion and implications
The recent Chinese P2P platform financial explosion turmoil highlights the importance of platform 
reputation. In this highly competitive industry, platforms with a good reputation can survive and 
sustain whereas those having a bad reputation could be eliminated. If financial explosion reaches a 
serious level, it will cause public panic and society turbulence. As such, examining how P2P platform 
reputation can positively or negatively affect lenders’ lending choices is an urgent and meaningful 
matter. This study has addressed this less researched area by examining what factors can influence 
P2P platform reputation and in what ways. Using data collected from 478 Chinese P2P platforms 
(about a quarter of the population) and rigorous statistical analysis, we tested platform reputation’s 
direct and indirect factors in influencing investors’ choices. 
The results conclude these findings (1): primarily, platform reputation can directly and positively 
influence investors’ investment choices (measured by lending transaction volume); (2) indirectly and 
positively, platform reputation affect investors’ investment choices through some platform credit 
enhancing information (i.e. platform registered capital, platforms located in the eastern region, 
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platforms with bank involved lending and guarantee methods). In other words, platform reputation 
negatively influences lending transaction volume through other credit enhancing information, such 
as platforms located in other regions, other platform types, interest and length of loans. Our findings 
also reveal (3) the quality of P2P platforms in China is wide ranging and many P2P platforms are 
poor quality; (4) the types of guarantee methods used by Chinese P2P platforms are less than two (a 
mean of 1.58); (5) imbalanced platform locations with three quarters (75%) located in the developed 
eastern region; (6) 80% are privately owned platforms (as expected); however their reputation is much 
lower than bank-involved platforms; and (7) platform reputation is negatively correlated with interest 
which suggests that P2P loan interest rates are not the main attracting factor for investors while other 
factors such as platform ownership and location are more important in investment decision making. 
An important contribution of this paper to literature is evidence provided that platform credit 
enhancing information provides platform reputation information onto investors (i.e. playing a mediate 
role). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first research examining the role of credit 
enhancing information between P2P lending platforms and their investors. Our findings have several 
important policy implications. Firstly, considering the fact there are many low-quality P2P platforms, 
Chinese central and local governments and industry associations (e.g. Internet Banking Association 
- IBA) need to speedily establish relevant regulations, policies and industrial standards to eliminate
these platforms in order to formalise, stabilise and improve the prosperity of the P2P lending market. 
In other words, new regulations/policies should protect effective platforms with good reputation. 
Secondly, although it is reasonable that the majority of P2P platforms are located in the developed 
eastern region, this imbalance in geographic distribution is worthy to note and preferential policies 
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should be established to support less developed regions (especially the western region). Thirdly, the 
majority (80%) of P2P platforms are privately owned and their reputation is significantly lower than 
bank-involved platforms. This is a special Chinese characteristic originating from the centrally 
planned economy where people regard state-owned bank involved platforms much safer than 
privately owned ones. However, in the P2P lending market, it is impossible that state-owned bank 
involved platforms can replace the latter. As such, regulations and policies to support and protect 
private platforms to help improve their reputation should be a long-term strategy for the Chinese 
government and industrial regulators. Fourthly, our findings reveal that Chinese P2P platforms use 
few guarantee methods, and this puts investors at greater risk. New industrial standards and 
regulations should also deal with this to protect the interest of lenders to minimise the turbulence of 
this market mentioned in the introduction. 
As with other studies, this research has several limitations. We highlight them in two aspects: one 
relates to sample size and another relates to proxy measurement. In terms of sample size, our sample 
contains 478 platforms which only counts for about one fourth of the platform population in China. 
This is because of the data availability from the popular platform portals in relation to variables 
assigned with our research objective. However, our sample made a balance between large and small 
platforms, as well as healthy and unhealthy platforms. With this unique feature, the sample’s 
representativeness of the population is good, and the findings consequently have explanation powers. 
With regards to the proxy measurement, the study uses platform trading volume as the proxy of 
platform reputation rather than investors direct feedback/experience. Although this measurement is 
indirect, it is reasonable when feedback/experience is absent or incomplete that platform transaction 
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value is one of the most important performance measurements used by platforms. Future research 
should also consider how to collect data to measure the roles of platform reputation in mitigating 
moral hazard of P2P platforms. In this paper we are only able to theoretically prove this role.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 Definition of Research Variables 
Variables Definition Measurement 
Dependent variable 
lnVolume Platform loan value Logarithm of the accumulated value of loans granted via sample platforms 
Prime independent variable 
Reputation Platform reputation Calculated using the Beta function 
Credit-enhancing independent 
variables 
lnCapital Platform registered capital Logarithm of platform registered capital 
Guarantee Capital guarantee methods used by platforms Numbers of types of capital guarantee methods 
Type Background of the platforms Using state-owned bank as benchmark, 3 dummy variables are defined as: 
Type 1 (privately owned platforms): 1 for yes and 0 for others;  
Type 2 (bank involved platforms): 1 for yes and 0 for others; 
Type 3 (publicly listed platforms): 1 for yes and 0 for others.  
45 
Address Geographical distribution1 of the platform 
(Central area, Eastern area and Western 
area). Central area as benchmark.   
2 dummy variables are defined as: 
Address 1 (platforms located in Eastern area): 1 for yes and 0 for others;  
Address 2 (platforms located in Western area): 1 for yes and 0 for others. 
Control variables 
Month Average loan length Average term (month) of online loans 
Interest Average annual loan interest rate Average annual interest rate of online loans 
Note: (1) ‘Guarantee’ is measured by the types (diversity) of capital guarantee methods as the more diversified guarantee methods used, the safer investors’ capital would be. These methods 
include loan loss provisioning, third-party guarantee, mortgage lending, platforms paying overdue loans, and small loan companies reviewing loans and assuming joint and several liabilities. (2) 
The eastern region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan. The central region includes Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei and Hunan. The western region includes Chongqing, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang. 
1 The geographical distribution was initially set by the People's Congress of China in 1986, measured by GDP per capita. As to 2017, there are 12 eastern coastal 
provinces/municipalities/autonomous regions are classified as developed, 12 in the west are less developed and 8 in central are between the East and West in terms of 
economic development.  
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Table 2 Ownership of Chinese P2P platforms 
Type Total trading volumn 
(100 million RMB) ) 
Platform 
(No.) 
Average trading volumn 
(Trading volumn/per 
platform) 
Average monthly lenders 
10,000/ per platform 
Average monthly borrowers 
10,000RMB/per platform 
Bank involved 164.92 6 27.48 5.375 5.82 
Publicly listed 618.03 115 5.37 1.054 1.138 
State-owned 205.09 212 0.967 0.190 0.205 
Privately 
owned 
900.26 1486 0.606 0.119 0.128 
Source: https://www.wdzj.com/ (网贷之家) 
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     Table 3  Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Sample Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Reputation 478 0.4978891 0.3093119 0.0005459 0.999851 
Interest 478 12.79919 3.956787 4.388333 32 
Month 478 4.63849 4.657924 0.5116667 43.45667 
lnVolume 478 10.36307 1.938305 3.849509 17.13208 
lnCapital 478 8.292295 1.030755 5.010635 12.61154 
Guarantee 478 1.582439 1.07353 0 7 
Adress1 478 0.7635983 0.4253168 0 1 
Adress2 478 0.0857741 0.2803235 0 1 
Type1 478 0.8012552 0.3994736 0 1 
Type2 478 0.0041841 0.0646168 0 1 
Type3 478 0.083682 0.2772004 0 1 
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Table 4 Correlation Analysis of Variables 
lnVolume  Reputation lnCapital Type1 Type2 Type3 Adress1 Adress2 Interest Month Guarantee 
lnVolume 1 
Reputation 0.1349* 1 
lnCapital 0.3469* 0.0331 1 
Type1 -0.2427* -0.1323* -0.2274* 1 
Type2 0.1038* -0.0272 0.1050* -0.1302* 1 
Type3 0.2175* 0.1130* 0.1696* -0.6068* -0.0196 1 
Adress1 0.3416* 0.0140 0.2390* -0.0673 0.0361 0.1148* 1 
Adress2 -0.1561* -0.0466 -0.1612* 0.0215 -0.0199 -0.0386 -0.5505* 1 
Interest -0.4128* -0.2332* -0.3097* 0.4076* -0.1097* -0.2385* -0.3244* 0.1222* 1 
Month 0.2445* 0.1452* 0.2207* -0.1428* 0.1052* 0.1559* 0.0651 -0.0757 -0.1326* 1 
Guarantee 0.0770 0.1633* 0.0267 -0.0847 0.0285 0.0254 -0.0112 0.0566 0.1469* 0.0941* 1 
Note: ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ represent statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 5 Regression Test of Direct Effect of Platform Reputation 
lnVolume lnVolume 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reputation 3.730*** 3.952*** 3.9798*** 1.943*** 2.448 2.473*** 
(0.590) (0.544) (0.5446) (0.630) (0.556) (0.557) 
Interest -0.323*** -0.305*** -0.3067*** -0.157*** -0.178*** -0.180***
(0.0419) (0.0387) (0.03866) (0.0456) (0.0402) (0.0402)
Month 0.100*** 0.114*** 0.1145*** 0.0871*** 0.0807*** 0.0811*** 
(0.0281) (0.0259) (0.2589) (0.0281) (0.0248) (0.0248) 
lnCapital 0.347*** 0.309*** 0.308*** 
(0.0910) (0.0803) (0.0803) 
Type1 -0.213 -0.186 -0.187
(0.287) (0.254) (0.254)
Type2 4.330*** 3.084** 3.087*** 
(1.370) (1.208) (1.208) 
Type3 0.499 0.445 0.455 
(0.399) (0.352) (0.352) 
Adress1 0.986*** 1.083*** 1.077*** 
(0.255) (0.225) (0.225) 
Adress2 0.0820 0.129 0.128 
(0.371) (0.327) (0.327) 
Guarantee 0.106 0.0829 0.0841 
(0.0832) （0.0734） （0.0735） 
Constant 10.28*** 9.967*** 9.9572*** 6.470*** 6.708*** 6.605*** 
(0.167) (0.154) (0.1544) (0.8540) (0.734) (0.741) 
R-squared 0.166 0.1679 0.2828 0.2836 
Pseudo R2 0.0977 0.1673 
Observations 478 478 478 478 478 478 
Note: ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ represent statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 6 Regression Test of Indirect Effect of Platform Reputation 
lnVolume Reputation Number of 
significant 
variable(s)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interest -0.0432* -0.0260 -0.0259 0.0693*** 0.0623*** 0.0623***  
(0.0247) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Month 0.104*** 0.0998*** 0.100*** 0.0091*** 0.0079*** 0.0074*** 
(0.0296) (0.0249) (0.249) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
lnCapital 0.334*** 0.356*** 0.356*** 0.0150** 0.0193*** 0.0194*** 2 
(0.0964) (0.0811) (0.0812) (0.0076) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
Type1 -0.503* -0.440* -0.443* -0.0784*** -0.104*** -0.103*** 2 
(0.299) (0.252) (0.252) (0.0237) (0.0205) (0.0205)
Type2 4.362*** 2.923** 2.294** 0.0579 -0.0657 -0.0658 1 
(1.462) (1.231) (1.232) (0.116) (0.100) (0.100) 
Type3 0.458 0.477 0.478 0.0181 0.0090 0.0090 no 
(0.426) (0.358) (0.359) (0.0337) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
Adress1 1.128*** 1.251*** 1.248*** 0.0560*** 0.0687*** 0.0691*** 2 
(0.268) (0.226) (0.226) (0.0212) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
Adress2 0.114 0.213 0.213 0.0331 0.0343 0.0343 no 
(0.369) (0.333) (0.333) (0.0313) (0.0272) (0.0272) 
Guarantee 0.128 0.109 0.110 0.00857 0.0105* 0.0104* no 
(0.0887) (0.0746) (0.0747) (0.0070) （0.0061） （0.0061） 
Constant 6.908*** 6.477*** 6.482*** -0.0823 -0.0493 -0.0498
(0.896) (0.755) (0.755) (0.0709) (0.0615) (0.0615) 
R-squared 0.253 0.2533 0.805 0.8051 
Pseudo R2 0.1525 0.6262 
Observations 478 478 478 478 478 478 
Note: ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ represent statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 7 Sobel test 
Type2 
Coef Std Err Z P>|Z| 
sobel 0.000757 0.00126 0.603 0.546 
Goodman-1(Aroian) 0.000757 0.00157 0.483 0.629 
Goodman-2 0.000757 0.00083 0.908 0.364 
a coefficient= 0.00484 0.00428 1.132 0.258 
bcoefficient= 0.156 0.219 0.713 0.476 
Indirect effect= 0.000757 0.00126 0.603 0.546 
Direct effect= 0.0258 0.0205 1.259 0.208 
Total effect= 0.025 0.0205 1.224 0.221 
Proportion of total effect that is mediated 0.03023 
Ratio of indirect to direct effect -0.0293
Ratio of total to direct effect 0.971 
52 
Table 8 Regression Test by adding instrumental variables 
1st stage 2nd stage 
Reputation lnVolume 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
edu 0.01750* 
(0.0129) 
Join 0.0648*** 
(0.01562) 
prRep 14.34*** 17.41*** 17.42*** 
(3.175) (2.609) (2.610) 
Interest 0.0624*** -0.936*** -1.110*** -1.111***
(0.0017) (0.199) (0.164) (0.164) 
Month 0.0058*** -0.0065 -0.0357 -0.0354
(0.0020) (0.0381) (0.0313) (0.0313) 
lnCapital 0.0149** 0.0739 0.0195 0.0187 
(0.0066) (0.113) (0.0925) (0.0926) 
Type1 -0.0877*** 1.064*** 1.368*** 1.365*** 
(0.0205) (0.441) (0.362) (0.363) 
Type2 -0.0903 5.370*** 4.066*** 4.068*** 
(0.0985) (1.448) (1.190) (1.190) 
Type3 0.0025 0.491 0.321 0.321 
(0.0287) (0.418) (0.344) (0.344) 
Adress1 0.058*** 0.0872 0.0540 0.0503 
(0.0182) (0.342) (0.281) (0.281) 
Adress2 0.0308 -0.591 -0.385 -0.386
(0.0267) (0.403) (0.331) (0.331) 
Guarantee 0.00682 -0.0098 -0.7414 -0.0731
(0.00603) (0.0930) (0.0764) (0.0765) 
Constant -0.0322 7.490*** 7.335*** 7.340*** 
(0.0604) (0.892) (0.733) (0.733) 
R-squared 0.813 0.318 0.3184 
Pseudo R2 0.1896 
Observations 478 478 478 478 
 Note: ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ represent statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 9 Robustness test 
lnTime 
（1） （2） （3） 
Reputation 0.0427 0.2243*** 0.2249*** 
(0.0724) (0.0860) -0.0861
Interest -0.0043 0.0116 0.0113 
(0.0064) (0.0076) (0.0077) 
Month 0.0202*** 0.0217*** 0.0218*** 
(0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
lnCapital 0.0008 0.0409 0.0405 
(0.0226) (0.0269) (0.0269) 
Type1 0.0799 0.0601 0.0605 
(0.0718) (0.0852) (0.0852) 
Type2 0.4160 0.5967 0.5956 
(0.3403) (0.4039) (0.4042) 
Type3 0.11489 0.2353* 0.2354* 
(0.0985) (0.1170) (0.1170) 
Adress1 0.0558 0.0448 0.0429 
(0.0639) (0.0759) (0.0759) 
Adress2 0.0569 0.0345 0.0340 
(0.0916) (0.1087) (0.1088) 
Guarantee 0.0313 0.0406* 0.0408* 
(0.0204) (0.0243) (0.0243) 
Constant 3.1280*** 2.4192*** 2.4268*** 
(0.2411) (0.2860) (0.2867) 
Observations 478 478 478 
R-squared 0.087 
Pseudo R2 0.0439 0.0367 
     Note: ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ represent statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Data sources: P2PEYE.com  
Note: hazardous plateforms refer to the platforms with overdue loans and bad debts. 
0
1000
2000
3000
2010
year
2011
year
2012
year
2013
year
2014
year
2015
year
2016
year
2017
year
Figure 1 number of newplatforms and 
added  hazardous platforms
Number of new platforms
Get Information and make credit rating 
Charge of loan management fee 
P2P Platform
Borrower 
Investor 
Payment of principal and interest 
Release of requirements on loans 
Charge of interest management fee 
Platform and borrower selection & investment 
Figure 2   Parties Involved in P2P Lending and Their Relationships 
